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Voluntary Surgical Castration of Sex 
Offenders 
WAIVING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
FROM CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In July 2005, Keith Raymond Fremin was about to go on 
trial in Covington, Louisiana for four counts of aggravated 
rape1 involving an eleven-year-old girl and her thirteen-year-
old sister.2  Fremin, a neighborhood resident, first gained the 
girls’ trust before victimizing them.3  Fremin started playing 
basketball with the young girls,4 eventually invited them to his 
home and sexually abused them.5  One of the victims told a 
classmate about the abuse and later reported the incidents to 
her teacher.6  Police arrested Fremin on January 27, 2004.7  
Like most sex offenders, this was not Fremin’s first offense.  
When police charged him with the 1999 rapes of these sisters, 
  
 1 Under Louisiana law, aggravated rape occurs when 
the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful 
consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or more of the 
following circumstances:  
(1) When the victim resists the act to the utmost, but whose resistance is 
overcome by force. 
(2) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act by threats of great 
and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution. 
(3) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act because the offender 
is armed with a dangerous weapon. 
(4) When the victim is under the age of thirteen years. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (Supp. 2006). 
 2 Meghan Gordon, Child Rapist OKs Surgical Castration: Rare Penalty 
Avoids Possible Life in Jail, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 13, 2005, at 1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
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Fremin was already on probation for molesting another young 
girl in 2003.8 
Fremin would face life imprisonment if a jury convicted 
him of this latest sexual offense.9  But prior to the start of trial, 
Fremin decided to plead guilty to two counts of forcible rape10 
and two counts of molestation.11  He also volunteered to be 
surgically castrated.12  The victims, then seventeen and 
nineteen-year old young women, agreed to the plea bargain.13  
The Louisiana State Court judge, Donald Fendlason, accepted 
the plea bargain and agreed to reduce Fremin’s sentence from 
forty years to twenty-five years in prison without parole or 
probation if Fremin underwent surgical castration.14  If Fremin 
did not undergo the procedure by August 18, 2005, the judge 
retained the authority to revoke the reduced sentence.15 
Due to the unique nature of sex offenders,16 it has been 
difficult for government agencies and courts to effectively 
punish sex offender activity.  Research has shown that sex 
offenders do not change their behavior in response to 
  
 8 Gordon, supra note 2. 
 9 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:537 (2005).  Prosecutors decided to seek a 
sentence of life in prison.  Gordon, supra note 2. 
 10 Forcible rape, as compared to aggravated rape, is committed when 
the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the 
lawful consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or more of 
the following circumstances:  
(1) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act by force or threats of 
physical violence under circumstances where the victim reasonably believes 
that such resistance would not prevent the rape. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.1 (Supp. 2006).  The maximum sentence for forcible rape 
under Louisiana law is forty years.  See id. 
 11 Gordon, supra note 2. 
 12 Id.  Surgical castration is an irreversible procedure that involves removal 
of the testes, which produce male hormones.  See infra Part I.   
 13 Gordon, supra note 2. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Plea Agreement Includes Castration, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at A20.  As 
of late August 2005, Fremin had not undergone the procedure and subsequent hearings 
on his case were postponed due to Hurricane Katrina.  E-mail from Meghan Gordon, 
Staff Writer, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Jan. 3, 2006, 12:43:00 EST) (on file with 
author). 
 16 Sex offenders are divided into four types.  A Type I offender denies 
commission of the crime.  The Type II offender will admit to committing the crime but 
will blame the commission on nonsexual or non-personal forces, such as drugs or 
stress.  A Type III offender engages in violent behavior prompted by non-sexual gain, 
such as power or anger.  The Type IV offender is a paraphiliac who demonstrates a 
pattern of sexual arousal, erection, or ejaculation.  Kimberly A. Peters, Chemical 
Castration: An Alternative to Incarceration, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 312 (1993). 
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traditional deterrents, such as prison, reproach from society, 
and other shame-inducing alternatives.17 
Sex offenders are not a homogenous group and 
motivations to commit sex offenses vary.18  This makes 
categorizing or treating sex offenders difficult.19  “Studies have 
shown that incarcerated child molesters continue to victimize 
young children once they are released on parole.”20  The United 
States Department of Justice reports that sex offenders are 
four times more likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested 
for another crime after their discharge from prison.21  High 
recidivism rates suggest that incarceration alone is ineffective 
and does not deter future sex offenses.22  As a result, state 
legislatures have turned to innovative and unusual approaches 
to punish sex offenders.23  Castration of sex offenders is among 
  
 17 Avital Stadler, California Injects New Life Into an Old Idea: Taking a Shot 
at Recidivism, Chemical Castration, and the Constitution, 46 EMORY L.J. 1285, 1285 
(1997) (“[S]exual offenders apparently do not change their behavior in response to 
traditional disincentives such as prison, shame and the like, to the same degree that 
ordinary criminals do.”). 
 18 Carol Gilchrist, An Examination of the Effectiveness of California’s 
Chemical Castration Bill in Preventing Sex Offenders from Reoffending, 7 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 181, 186 (1998) (“Although all pedophiles exhibit [an] attraction to 
prepubescent children, child molesters are not a homogenous group.  No accepted or 
empirically derived reason explains why people are attracted to minors . . . .”). 
 19 Id. (stating that “because sex offenders’ motivations vary, sex offenders 
cannot be easily categorized or cured”). 
 20 Jennifer M. Bund, Did You Say Chemical Castration?, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 
157, 162 (1997). 
 21 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Offenders Statistics, http://www.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#sex (last visited Sept. 14, 2006). 
 22 Bund, supra note 20. 
 23 Such innovative and unusual approaches to punishing and deterring sex 
offender activity include two recent appellate court decisions.  Those cases held that 
sexually explicit writing can be considered child pornography and that a person can be 
punished for sexually fantasizing about children.  Jennifer B. Siverts, Punishing 
Thoughts Too Close to Reality: A New Solution to Protect Children from Pedophiles, 27 
T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 393, 407 (2005) (discussing State v. Dalton, 793 N.E.2d 509 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2003) and Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004)).  One attempt 
to deter sex offender activity requires sex offenders to register with the local 
communities in which they settle after completing their prison sentence.  Katie 
Granlund, Does Societal Input Lead to Successful Sex Offender Legislation?, 29 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 197, 206 (2005) (discussing Megan’s Law, which requires a state to 
release information to the public about registered sex offenders).  A recent development 
in imposing harsher penalties for sex offenders involves requiring offenders to wear 
global positioning ankle bracelets for a decade or more after they get out of prison.  
Kim Chandler, Tougher Penalties OK’d for Sex Offenders: Some Must Wear Ankle 
Bracelet Monitors for Decade or Longer After Leaving Prison, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.), 
July 27, 2005, at 1.  Alabama’s legislature became one of the first to enact this 
program.  Id.  Florida also requires certain offenders to wear the bracelets for life and 
New Jersey has approved a two-year pilot program.  Id.  Other states are currently 
experimenting with the idea.  Id.  Additionally, one recent case highlights the newest 
approach states might use to preempt sex offenders from re-offending.  In 
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the methods states are using to fill the gaps left by more 
traditional punishments. 
The case of Keith Fremin adds a new dimension to the 
ongoing debate about using castration to punish sex offenders24 
since Fremin volunteered25 for surgical castration in exchange 
for a reduced sentence.26  First, surgical castration raises the 
issue of whether such a punishment violates the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.27  Second, since the procedure has been considered 
cruel and unusual punishment by one state supreme court28 
and is unlikely to pass constitutional scrutiny if it reaches the 
United States Supreme Court,29 surgical castration raises the 
  
Pennsylvania, a young woman married for three years to a previously convicted sex 
offender became pregnant with his child.  The husband had been convicted twenty-two 
years earlier of rape and sodomy of two teenage girls and served ten years in jail.  
Pennsylvania authorities monitored the woman’s pregnancy and, upon her giving 
birth, removed the newborn from its home pursuant to a court order.  Kate Zernike, 
Officials Remove Newborn over Father’s Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2005, at A5.  
Even the power of celebrity is being used to protect children from sex offenders.  In 
October 2005, Oprah Winfrey launched a campaign on her daytime television show in 
which she appealed to the public to help locate, arrest, and convict sex offenders on the 
run.  See Child Predator Watch List, http://www2.oprah.com/presents/2005/predator/ 
predator_main.jhtml (last visited Sept. 14, 2006). 
 24 See generally Linda Beckman, Chemical Castration: Constitutional Issues 
of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 100 W. VA. L. 
REV. 853 (1998) (listing the constitutional issues that mandatory chemical castration 
raises). 
 25 Some scholars have argued that waiver of a constitutional right pursuant 
to plea bargaining can never be voluntary.  Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: 
MPA Treatment of the Sexual Offender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 21 (1990) (“Critics 
contend that since a convicted offender will go to great lengths to retain his freedom—
including bartering his body—voluntary consent to [chemical castration] is 
precluded.”); Pamela K. Hicks, Castration of Sexual Offenders: Legal and Ethical 
Issues, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 641, 651 (1993) (“The mere fact that the accused must face 
the consequences of his crime does not make consent invalid.  The pressure in making 
a decision alone does not vitiate a voluntary act or admission if state actors do not 
impose any coercion or duress.”); Jeffrey N. Hurwitz, House Arrest: A Critical Analysis 
of an Intermediate-Level Penal Sanction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 794-95 (1987) 
(“[A]lthough the doctrine appears to expand individual choices by allowing a person to 
forego a given right in exchange for some benefit, waiver of rights often occurs in 
situations where the individual has, in fact, no real choice at all.”).  While there are 
strong arguments in support of that position, for the purposes of this Note, we assume 
that sex offenders who choose surgical castration make a voluntary rather than coerced 
choice. 
 26 Gordon, supra note 2 (stating that “Fremin . . . volunteered to undergo 
castration, a move criminal justice experts called extremely rare” and that the 
“[P]resident of the Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers . . . said the 
surgery is a ‘very unusual’ penalty that could only be initiated by the defendant”). 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 28 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 29 See discussion infra Part III. 
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question of whether a sex offender who has voluntarily chosen 
to undergo the procedure should be able to waive the Eighth 
Amendment protection. 
This Note focuses on the legal and practical reasons sex 
offenders should be able to waive the Eighth Amendment 
protection and choose surgical castration.  Part I of this Note 
discusses why surgical castration is an effective approach to 
punishing sex offenders and the growing acceptance of the 
procedure.  Part II examines the history of the Eighth 
Amendment’s protection from cruel and unusual punishment 
and cases interpreting the constitutionality of surgical 
castration.  Part III of this Note then applies the analytical 
framework created by the Supreme Court to determine when a 
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment and argues that 
surgical castration is cruel and unusual punishment. 
Part IV examines waiver of the Eighth Amendment 
protection and asserts that, in cases where sex offenders 
volunteer for surgical castration, society’s interest in the 
Eighth Amendment is diminished.  Therefore, sex offenders 
should be permitted to waive the Eighth Amendment and 
choose surgical castration.  Finally, Part V proposes that the 
best approach to determining when surgical castration, and 
therefore a waiver of a constitutional protection, is acceptable 
requires courts to balance the interests of the defendant, 
criminal justice system, and society. 
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I. SURGICAL CASTRATION AS A RESPONSE TO SEX 
OFFENDER ACTIVITY 
Surgical castration,30 also known as orchiectomy, is an 
irreversible procedure that involves the removal of the testes, 
which produce the male hormones.31  It does not involve 
amputation of the penis.32  The procedure itself is simple and 
  
 30 Castration of sex offenders is not a new concept.  In the past decade, 
chemical castration has emerged as a response to sex offender activity.  The procedure 
involves the use of medroxyprogesterone acetate (“MPA”), which is more commonly 
known as Depo-Provera, a birth control drug for women.  The drug restricts the release 
of luteinizing hormones from the pituitary gland.  This treatment addresses sex 
offenders’ inability to control their sexually offensive behavior.  Peters, supra note 16, 
at 310-11.  By reducing testosterone levels, the drug also diminishes compulsive erotic 
fantasies and lowers male sex drive.  Id. at 311.  The drug does not cause impotence 
during treatment and individuals can still experience erections and ejaculations.  
Karen J. Rebish, Nipping the Problem in the Bud: The Constitutionality of California’s 
Castration Law, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 507, 518 (1998).  In 1996, California 
became the first state to enact chemical castration legislation in response to sex 
offender activity.  See Philip J. Henderson, Section 645 of the California Penal Code: 
California’s “Chemical Castration” Law—A Panacea or Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment?, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 653, 653 (1998).  A number of other states followed 
California’s lead and more than half have either considered or passed chemical 
castration legislation.  Robert D. Miller, Forced Administration of Sex-Drive Reducing 
Medications to Sex Offenders: Treatment or Punishment?, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
175, 188 (1998).  There has been a vocal community of critics, including medical 
practitioners and the American Civil Liberties Union, against chemical castration of 
sex offenders.  Hicks, supra note 25, at 665-66; Siverts, supra note 23, at 403 
(“California’s bold measure has raised the eyebrows of more than a few critics, most 
notably the American Civil Liberties Union, which has condemned the law as cruel and 
unusual punishment.”).  But see Lisa Keesling, Practicing Medicine Without a License: 
Legislative Attempts to Mandate Chemical Castration for Repeat Sex Offenders, 32 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 381, 395 n.129 (1999) (In a June 1994 survey of American voters 
conducted by Princeton Survey Research, 59% of respondents said they supported 
surgical or chemical castration for repeat sex offenders.).  See also Douglas J. Besharov 
& Andrew Vachhs, Sex Offenders: Is Castration an Acceptable Punishment?, 78 
A.B.A.J. 42 (“[C]hemical ‘castration’ . . . has been an accepted treatment for many sex 
offenders.”).  Chemical castration is not an effective method of dealing with sex 
offender activity for a number of reasons.  Unlike surgical castration, chemical 
castration does not permanently alter the sex offender since testosterone levels can 
normalize once the injections cease.  Stadler, supra note 17, at 1290.  This is of 
particular concern because, when not taking the drugs, the sex offender “will not have 
the willpower to control his deviant sexual behavior.”  Rebish, supra, at 517.  Further, 
in states with chemical castration laws, the decision to administer the procedure is not 
left up to the defendant.  Rather, these laws often mandate court-ordered chemical 
castration for repeat sex offenders.  William Winslade, T. Howard Stone, Michele 
Smith-Bell & Denise M. Webb, Castrating Pedophiles Convicted of Sex Offenses Against 
Children: New Treatment or Old Punishment?, 51 SMU L. REV. 349, 376-81 (1998) 
[hereinafter Winslade et al.].  Experts claim that deterrence of future sexual offenses 
depends significantly on whether the sex offender understands that what he did was 
wrong and whether he has volunteered for the procedure.  Peters, supra note 16, at 
313. 
 31 Rebish, supra note 30, at 517; Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 369 
(discussing the details of surgical castration).   
 32 Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 369. 
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involves a small incision in the scrotum to remove the testes.33  
The procedure’s “primary effect is to diminish [the sex 
offender]’s physical and emotional ability to respond to sexual 
stimuli.”34   
Surgical castration has been used successfully by other 
countries to treat sex offenders.35  Research from these 
countries indicates that the removal of the testes is an effective 
method in reducing recidivism rates.36  A 1979 European study 
of sex offenders found that the recidivism rate of castrates was 
2.3 percent, compared to thirty-nine percent for non-castrates.37  
Still another study indicates that only three percent of 
surgically castrated offenders committed a subsequent sex 
offense, while members of the non-castrate control group had a 
forty-six percent recidivism rate.38  These studies provide 
strong evidence that surgical castration is an effective method 
of deterring sex offenders. 
Proponents of the procedure argue that surgical 
castration is minimally invasive because it is not major surgery 
and is often performed on an outpatient basis.39  Further, the 
primary advantage of surgical castration to other forms of 
punishment is in its permanence.  In fact, there is no risk that 
offenders will manipulate the procedure as they could with 
drug therapy40 and this produces long-lasting results.41 
  
 33 Kris W. Druhm, A Welcome Return to Draconia: California Penal Law § 
645, The Castration of Sex Offenders and the Constitution, 61 ALB. L. REV. 285, 294 
(1997). 
 34 Rebish, supra note 30, at 515 (discussing the effectiveness of surgical 
castration). 
 35 Surgical castration has been used by many European countries, including 
Denmark and Germany, and studies show that those countries have drastically 
reduced recidivism rates compared to sex offenders who were not surgically castrated.  
Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 370, 372.  See also Stacy Russell, Castration of Repeat 
Sexual Offenders: An International Comparative Analysis, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 425, 
442-47 (1997) (surveying surgical castration legislation in European countries). 
 36 Amy Dorsett, Castration Success Considered, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, May 8, 2005, at 1B (“Surgical castration, when used in conjunction with other 
forms of therapy, can dramatically reduce sexual predators’ rates of re-offending.”). 
 37 Jodi Berlin, Chemical Castration of Sex Offenders: “A Shot in the Arm” 
Towards Rehabilitation, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 169, 179 (1997) (discussing a study of the 
effects of castration on sex offenders in Germany). 
 38 Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 371 (discussing another study in 
Germany of surgically castrated sex offenders). 
 39 Druhm, supra note 33, at 295. 
 40 Hicks, supra note 25, at 646. 
 41 Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 353. 
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Others argue that surgical castration is a fitting 
punishment for heinous sexual crimes.42  An ardent supporter 
of surgical castration, Texas district court judge Michael T. 
McSpadden, subscribes to this justification.43  In 1992, 
McSpadden presided over the case of Steven Allen Butler, who 
sexually assaulted44 a thirteen-year-old girl while he was still 
on probation for fondling a seven-year-old girl in 1989.45  Butler 
volunteered to be surgically castrated in exchange for a lighter 
sentence46 and McSpadden agreed.47  While surgical castration 
is still only rarely used in the United States to respond to sex 
offender activity, there have been recent indications that the 
procedure is becoming more acceptable to society as a way to 
punish sex offenders. 
  
 42 Id. 
 43 See Michael T. McSpadden, Op-Ed., Conventional Therapy Doesn’t Stop 
Sexual Predators. A Simple Surgical Procedure Will, TEX. LAW., June 30, 1997, at 22. 
 44 Under Texas law, a person commits sexual assault on a child when the 
person intentionally or knowingly: 
(A) causes the penetration of the anus or female sexual organ of a child by 
any means; 
(B) causes the penetration of the mouth of a child by the sexual organ of the 
actor; 
(C) causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or penetrate the mouth, 
anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor; 
(D) causes the anus of a child to contact the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of 
another person, including the actor; or 
(E) causes the mouth of a child to contact the anus or sexual organ of another 
person, including the actor. 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2) (2005). 
 45 Robert Crowe, Castration no Cure for Pedophilia: Drugs, Surgery May 
Temper Drive, but Sexual Interest Won’t “Normalize,” HOUS. CHRON., May 10, 2005, at 
B1. 
 46 Peters, supra note 16, at 307 (“In March, 1992, Steven Allen Butler, an 
accused rapist, asked a Texas District Judge to punish him via castration rather than 
imprisonment.”). 
 47 Crowe, supra note 45.  However, the surgery never took place due to public 
opposition.   Kari A. Vanderzyl, Castration as an Alternative to Incarceration: An 
Impotent Approach to the Punishment of Sex Offenders, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 107, 107 
(1994) (“In March of 1992, Steven Allen Butler . . . requested that [Judge McSpadden] 
order surgical castration rather than sentencing him to prison.  Judge McSpadden 
initially assented to the request, but ultimately withdrew approval in the wake of 
national publicity and protests by civil libertarians.  Physicians in the area refused to 
perform the operation, and even Butler found himself reconsidering his unusual 
request.”). See also John Makeig & Julie Mason, Butler’s Family Relieved: Controversy 
Kills Castration Plan: Physicians won’t Do Procedure on Accused Child Rapist, HOUS. 
CHRON., Mar. 17, 1992, at A1. 
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A. State Legislation and Surgical Castration 
Texas is currently one of a few states that have passed 
legislation explicitly allowing surgical castration.48  On May 21, 
1997, then Governor George W. Bush signed into law a bill 
entitled Orchiectomy for Certain Sex Offenders.49  The bill 
provides that prison inmates over the age of twenty-one “who 
have been twice convicted for indecency, sexual assault, or 
aggravated sexual assault involving a child younger than 
seventeen [may]…undergo surgical castration.”50  The offender 
must submit to a mental health examination before it can be 
performed.51 
The legislation expressly forbids judges and the parole 
board from requiring defendants to be surgically castrated.52  
Instead, the offender must volunteer for surgical castration.53  
Notably, the legislation is entirely devoid of any penal objective 
and the state is not allowed to offer reduced sentencing or 
probation in lieu of sentencing to induce sex offenders to 
volunteer for the procedure.54  This might explain why only a 
few Texas inmates have volunteered to have the surgery since 
the procedure became available in 1997.55  Without the promise 
  
 48 Other states that allow for surgical castration include California and 
Montana.  See generally Winslade et al., supra note 30.  In 1999, the Oklahoma 
legislature considered a bill that would allow surgical castration for convicted sex 
offenders, but “[e]ven its most ardent supporters in the House believe it is 
unconstitutional because it would impose cruel and unusual punishment.”  Tim Talley, 
Politically Charged Legislation, THE JOURNAL RECORD (Okla. City), Mar. 16, 1999, 
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4182/is_19990316/ai_ 
n10125190.  However, Oklahoma senators passed legislation to give judges the option 
of sentencing sex offenders to chemical castration or surgical castration.  John 
Griener, Senate Approves Castration of Sex Offenders, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 11, 
1999, at 8. 
 49 Associated Press, Bush Signs Child Molester Castration Bill, FORTH 
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 21, 1997, at 6 (reporting the signing of TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN. § 501.061 (2006)). 
 50 Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 385 (describing the Texas legislation). 
 51 Id. (“Additionally, a psychiatrist and a psychologist who have experience in 
treating sex offenders must evaluate the inmate . . .”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. (“There are several provisions in [the Texas bill] that . . . are clearly 
intended to ensure that surgical castration is a voluntary, non-coercive, and clearly 
therapeutic undertaking.”). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Dorsett, supra note 36; Robert Tharp, Molester is Judged Threat to Dallas: 
Pedophile Jones to Remain under House Arrest Indefinitely, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
June 17, 2005, at 1B.   “The first castration [occurred] in December 2001.  The other 
[two] took place in March 2004.”  Crowe, supra note 45.  “[Texas] officials will not 
release the names of the three who [opted for] the procedure.”  Id.  However, notorious 
 
698 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
of reduced incarceration, sex offenders are less willing to 
undergo the procedure. 
A number of states have considered or are now 
considering following Texas and enacting surgical castration 
laws.  In Minnesota, a group of legislators proposed that 
serious sex offenders should be subject to court-ordered 
castration, either surgical or chemical.56  The legislation 
received significant public support.  A 1991 poll found that 
fifty-six percent of the public support surgical castration of 
repeat sex offenders.57 
In Alabama, Rep. Steve Hurst pre-filed a bill in 
September 2005 that would allow persons over the age of 
twenty-one who are convicted of sex offenses against a child 
younger than twelve to be surgically castrated before gaining 
their release from the Department of Corrections.58  Hurst 
introduced an amendment in 2005 providing for surgical 
castration that passed in the House, but later withdrew it 
because of concerns that the amendment could be 
unconstitutional.59  His new bill was scheduled to be considered 
in the 2006 legislative session.60 
Notably, in most states that allow chemical castration, 
surgical castration is often an option for the sex offender.61  In 
California, Florida, and Montana, states which have chemical 
castration laws, a defendant may also voluntarily undergo 
surgical castration.62  The Florida legislation places a premium 
on the sex offender’s consent to the procedure.  In emphasizing 
the requirement that the defendant must consent to surgical 
castration, the law refers to language used to describe when 
waivers of constitutional rights are valid.  The law provides 
that sex offenders may request surgical castration only if their 
  
child molester Larry Don McQuay admitted that he is one of three to have undergone 
surgical castration.  Dorsett, supra note 36.  See also discussion infra Part I.B. 
 56 Conrad deFiebre, Bill Proposes Castration for Some Sex Offenders, STAR 
TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), Feb. 18, 2005, at 4B. 
 57 Id. 
 58 John Davis & Jannell McGrew, Alabama Lawmakers Line up Crusades for 
Next Session, MONTGOMERY ADVISER (Ala.), Sept. 6, 2005, at A1.  
 59 Id.  See also Chandler, supra note 23 (“Some House members reluctantly 
agreed to remove language that would have required mandatory surgical castration for 
sex offenders convicted of crimes against children under 12.  [Attorney General] King 
and some lawmakers said they feared the castration provision would make the bill 
unconstitutional because of inhumane punishment.”). 
 60 Davis & McGrew, supra note 58. 
 61 Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 377, 381 (discussing state chemical 
castration bills, some of which also allow surgical castration).   
 62 Id. at 383. 
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consent is “intelligent, knowing, and voluntary.”63  Based on 
this language, it appears that involuntary or court-mandated 
surgical castration is more of a concern to states than when the 
defendant volunteers for the procedure. 
B. A Growing Number of Sex Offenders Have Volunteered 
for Surgical Castration When Reduced Sentencing is an 
Incentive 
A number of sex offenders have chosen to undergo 
surgical castration.64  Sex offenders who volunteer for surgical 
castration often do so because they believe their chances of an 
early release from prison will increase and the likelihood of re-
offending will decrease.  In these cases, courts must determine 
whether the procedure is an effective substitute to the more 
traditional punishment of prolonged incarceration. 
If the court considers the procedure an effective 
substitute, the sex offender might gain his release from prison 
or a lighter prison sentence.  Of paramount consideration is 
whether the sex offender is likely to commit more sex crimes.  
A number of courts have granted sex offenders their freedom 
for undergoing the procedure or given drastically reduced 
sentences.65 
Jim Elkins, a former baseball coach in Bossier, 
Louisiana, pled guilty to three counts of fondling juveniles in 
  
 63 Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.0235). 
 64 Guy Ashley, Sex Offender at ASH is Set for Castration: Greg Grant is 
Convinced Surgery Will Bring a Cure for the Fantasies That Have Ailed Him; The 
Procedure Puts Him at the Center of Decades-old Controversy, THE TRIBUNE (San Luis 
Obispo, Cal.), Aug. 29, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 13556669 (“Greg Grant is 
scheduled for castration this morning, convinced that [it is] a cure for the deviant 
sexual fantasies that have ailed him for decades”); Dorsett, supra note 36 (Larry Don 
McQuay, “who claimed to have molested more than 200 children and animals, was 
granted his wish of surgical castration within the last year by the Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice”); Monte Morin, Graduate of Sex Offender Program is Released, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 19749979 (stating that “[i]n an effort to 
win his freedom, [Brian] DeVries underwent voluntary chemical and surgical 
castration”); Tharp, supra note 55 (stating that David Wayne Jones elected to undergo 
surgical castration as his parole date approached); Terry Vau Dell, Trial Begins in 
Molester’s Bid for Freedom/Castration, OROVILLE MERCURY REGISTER (Cal.), Sept. 2, 
2005 (LexisNexis) (stating that Bruce Clotfelter underwent voluntary surgical 
castration after he was released on parole for a prior conviction but arrested a few 
months later when he was found near elementary schools); Brian Vernellis, Keeping 
Sexual Predators out of Youth Sports, THE TIMES (Shreveport, La.), June 26, 2005 
(Lexis Nexis) (“Jim Elkins, a former Bossier Police Jury president and longtime Bossier 
Dixie baseball coach, pleaded guilty to three counts of fondling juveniles in 1997.  He 
volunteered for surgical castration and is serving a 25-year sentence.”). 
 65 See infra Part I.B. 
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1997 and volunteered for surgical castration as part of the plea 
bargain.66  After learning that Elkins had been surgically 
castrated, the judge sentenced Elkins to twenty-five years in 
prison.67  The judge admitted that if Elkins had not been 
castrated, he would have imposed the maximum penalty of 
forty-five years in prison.68 
Brian DeVries served an eight-year prison sentence for 
molesting nine young boys.69   He became California’s first 
sexually violent offender to receive treatment at Atascadero 
State Hospital70 where he underwent seven years of intensive 
psychiatric treatment.71  In an effort to win his freedom, 
DeVries also underwent voluntary surgical castration in 2001.72  
DeVries spent one year of strict monitoring that a state court 
judge called severe and extreme supervision.73  In September 
2004, the judge graduated DeVries from the state treatment 
program and granted him unconditional release.74  The judge 
stated that surgical castration and time spent in the treatment 
program meant DeVries was no longer a danger to the public75 
and pointed to the fact that DeVries was not aroused by 
deviant pornography during treatment.76 
Larry Don McQuay is one of the few sex offenders in 
Texas known to have been surgically castrated.  He molested 
more than 200 children and animals.77  McQuay’s first prison 
sentence for child molestation came in 1990 for a term of eight 
years.78  But a jury again indicted him in 1996 on three new 
charges for which he was convicted and sentenced to twenty 
years.79  In 1996, McQuay waged a public campaign to be 
  
 66 Vernellis, supra note 64. 
 67 Id. 
 68 The judge also stated that “[t]here’s no way I can make you be 
castrated. . . .  If you plea and don’t get castrated, [it could mean] 45 years.”  
Briefly/Nation, THE HERALD SUN (Durham, N.C.), Aug. 9, 1998, at A9.  
 69 Morin, supra note 64; Alan Gathright, Judge Declares Molester Free to 
Leave, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 14, 2004, at A1. 
 70 Alan Gathright, supra note 69. 
 71 Morin, supra note 64. 
 72 Id.; Gathright, supra note 69. 
 73 Gathright, supra note 69. 
 74 Morin, supra note 64. 
 75 Gathright, supra note 69. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Dorsett, supra note 36. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
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surgically castrated80 because he believed it would prevent him 
from committing future sexual assaults.81  McQuay’s case 
pushed Texas to allow surgical castration of repeat sex 
offenders under the 1997 Texas Bill.82  Finally, in 2004, the 
Texas Department of Criminal Justice granted his request for 
surgical castration.83  In May 2005, the court released McQuay 
from prison for good behavior.84  These cases suggest that 
voluntary surgical castration can not only convince courts that 
the offender is less likely to re-offend, but can also be an 
effective punishment of sex offender activity. 
II. SURGICAL CASTRATION AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT 
Despite some acceptance and positive findings, surgical 
castration remains rare and is not widely supported in the 
United States.85  In fact, one court has held, and others have 
intimated, that surgical castration is cruel and unusual 
punishment.86  With the possibility that more states will enact 
legislation allowing surgical castration or courts will confront 
more cases where the defendant volunteers for the procedure, 
  
 80 Id. 
 81 Crowe, supra note 45. 
 82 Dorsett, supra note 36.  Interestingly, McQuay’s case came only two years 
after public outrage over Steven Allen Butler’s request for surgical castration.  See 
infra Part I (discussing Steven Allen Butler and his request for the procedure).  
McQuay’s request did not produce the same opposition and, in fact, led to public 
pressure on Texas to allow the procedure, mainly because McQuay’s request was based 
on his belief that he would continue to re-offend if he was not castrated.  Druhm, supra 
note 33, at 291-92 (discussing McQuade’s case). 
 83 Dorsett, supra note 36. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Larry Helm Spalding, Florida’s 1997 Chemical Castration Law: A Return 
to the Dark Ages, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 121 (1998).  See also Besharov & Vachhs, 
supra note 30 (“Surgical castration has never been very popular in this 
country . . . .  Although many castrated men may be capable of intercourse, the limited 
research that exists suggests that the repeat-offense rate is low.  On humanitarian and 
civil liberties grounds, however, most experts now oppose the procedure and it is 
unlikely that many courts will turn to it as an alternative to incarceration”); Druhm, 
supra note 33, at 296 (“Despite the evidence indicating its effectiveness, surgical 
castration as a treatment is not widely accepted, especially in America”); Rebish, supra 
note 30, at 523 (“Surgical castration of sexual offenders has not been well received in 
American courts.”).  But see deFiebre, supra note 56 (“A 1991 Star Tribune Minnesota 
Poll found support among 56 percent of the public for surgical castration of repeat sex 
offenders”). 
 86 State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1985) (holding that surgical 
castration is a form of mutilation and, therefore, cruel and unusual punishment under 
state law).  See infra Part II.B. 
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courts must consider whether this type of punishment is 
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 
A. History and Purpose of the Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.”87  In Trop v. Dulles,88 the 
Supreme Court observed that the Eighth Amendment 
protection is aimed at preserving “nothing less than the dignity 
of man.  While the State has the power to punish, the 
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised 
within the limits of civilized standards.”89  This articulation 
describes the purpose and spirit of the amendment. 
The Court has established certain criteria to determine 
when a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.90  First, a 
court must determine whether the punishment is inherently 
cruel.  This is done by examining “objective indicia that reflect 
the public attitude toward a given sanction.”91  The analysis 
must consider that the Amendment draws its meaning “from 
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”92 
The punishment must not be unacceptable to society.93  
Whether a punishment conforms to society’s contemporary 
standards of decency depends on “whether people who were 
fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its 
liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, and 
unacceptable.”94  A society that once considered a particular 
punishment acceptable may later consider it indecent and, 
therefore, a violation of the Eighth Amendment.95  Similarly, a 
punishment that might have been indecent decades ago might 
be appropriate today. 
  
 87 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 88 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 89 Id. at 100. 
 90 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); See also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, 
Let’s Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615, 625 (2000) (discussing the test created by Gregg). 
 91 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
 92 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
 93 Hicks, supra note 25, at 658 (“In determining whether a punishment falls 
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment ban, the Supreme Court has used 
several criteria, including whether the punishment is . . . unacceptable to society”). 
 94 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 95 Id. at 329-30. 
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Second, a punishment must not exceed what is 
necessary to accomplish the state’s legitimate aims.96  This 
means that the punishment must be commensurate with the 
offense for which it is imposed rather than be grossly out of 
proportion to the severity of the crime.97  Also, the punishment 
must not be inflicted arbitrarily.98 
The Supreme Court has held certain kinds of 
punishments to be unconstitutional.  It has found extreme 
physical suffering to be cruel and unusual because it is 
disproportionate to the crime.99  The Court has also considered 
severe mental pain cruel and unusual punishment even though 
there may be “no physical mistreatment.”100  In dicta, the Court 
has mentioned that beheadings, burning alive, and emboweling 
would all violate the Eighth Amendment.101 
While the Court has not addressed the particular issue 
of whether surgical castration imposed as part of a sentence 
would violate the Eighth Amendment, there is language in 
lower court Eighth Amendment cases that intimate that 
castration would be unconstitutional.  In Whitten v. State,102 a 
jury convicted the defendant of assault and battery and 
sentenced him to six months in prison.  On appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Georgia, the defendant claimed that his 
sentence was cruel and unusual.103  Concerning whether the 
punishment was cruel and unusual, the court observed that the 
clause “was, doubtless, intended to prohibit the barbarities of 
quartering, hanging in chains, [and] castration”.104  The court 
affirmed the punishment, stating that “the object of 
punishment is to prevent crime.”105 
In Davis v. Berry,106 the Iowa Board of Parole ordered 
that a prison inmate receive a vasectomy, pursuant to a state 
statute requiring the procedure for repeat felons.107  The court 
compared vasectomy to castration and observed that castration 
  
 96 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
 97 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
 98 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 381). 
 99 Weems, 217 U.S. at 370. 
 100 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 101 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878). 
 102 Whitten v. Georgia, 47 Ga. 297 (1872). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 301. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914). 
 107 Id. at 417. 
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is more severe and that, for each procedure, “[t]he physical 
suffering may not be so great, but that is not the only test of 
cruel punishment; the humiliation, the degradation, the mental 
suffering are always present and known by all the public, and 
will follow him wheresoever he may go.”108  The court held that 
the procedure was unconstitutional on cruel and unusual 
punishment grounds.109 
Aside from judicial opinions on the subject, there is a 
plethora of scholarly articles suggesting that surgical 
castration would not pass constitutional scrutiny.  These 
arguments focus on the nature of the procedure, that it is 
permanent and disfiguring, and that surgical castration is 
more akin to other physical forms of punishment that courts 
consider unconstitutional or society finds repugnant.110 
B. The Leading State Decision on the Constitutionality of 
Surgical Castration: State v. Brown 
The only court to have ruled on the constitutionality of 
surgical castration of sex offenders is the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina in State v. Brown.111  In that case, three 
defendants committed a brutal gang rape.112  Instead of going to 
trial, the defendants pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal 
sexual conduct.113  At sentencing, the trial judge ordered that 
each defendant be imprisoned for thirty years, the maximum 
  
 108 Id. at 416. 
 109 Id. at 417. 
 110 Druhm, supra note 33, at 315 (“Surgical castration is very severe and 
unlikely to pass any Eighth Amendment analysis because it is permanent and 
disfiguring.”); Stadler, supra note 17, at 1322 (“There is little question that actual 
castration would be considered a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 111 State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410 (1985). 
 112 Keesling, supra note 30, at 390 n.87 (discussing the facts of State v. Brown, 
326 S.E.2d 410 (1985)). 
 113 Brown, 326 S.E.2d at 410.  Under South Carolina law,  
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if the actor 
engages in sexual battery with the victim and if any one or more of the 
following circumstances are proven:  
(a) The actor uses aggravated force to accomplish sexual battery. 
(b) The victim submits to sexual battery by the actor under circumstances 
where the victim is also the victim of forcible confinement, kidnapping, 
robbery, extortion, burglary, housebreaking, or any other similar offense or 
act. 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 (2005). 
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sentence under South Carolina law at that time.114  The judge, 
however, went on to state a condition of probation that could 
reduce the sentence.115  The defendants could receive suspended 
sentences and probation imposed for five years if they agreed to 
surgical castration.116  The defendants initially appealed the 
sentence but later withdrew their appeals117 and defendant 
Brown sought a writ of mandamus to compel the execution of 
the suspended sentence.118 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina ruled 
that voluntary surgical castration as a condition of a suspended 
sentence and probation was unconstitutional under the state 
constitution.119  While the court recognized that a trial judge 
has wide discretion in imposing conditions on sentences and 
probation, it emphasized the fact that a judge may not impose 
or accept conditions that are against public policy.120  In 
determining public policy, the court looked to the state 
constitution, statutes and judicial decisions,121 and determined 
that castration is a form of mutilation.122  Therefore, it 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.123 
Given that the procedure would be cruel and unusual 
under the South Carolina constitution, the court rejected that 
the defendant could waive this constitutional right.  The court 
stated that, “notwithstanding that the defendant accepted the 
condition, thereby attempting to waive his right to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment, the condition was void because 
a state ‘cannot impose conditions which are illegal and void as 
against public policy.’”124  A defendant “may not waive the 
constitutional ban [on cruel and unusual punishment] and thus 
empower the state to impose a punishment that it is otherwise 
  
 114 Hicks, supra note 25, at 652 n.101. 
 115 Druhm, supra note 33, at 289 (“No South Carolina statute required 
castration at the time; instead, the judge was using his discretion to suspend sentences 
subject to court-imposed conditions.”). 
 116 Brown, 326 S.E.2d at 410. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 412.  The South Carolina state constitution is similar to the United 
States Constitution.  It states that: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall 
excessive fines be imposed, nor shall cruel, nor corporal, nor unusual punishment be 
inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.”  S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15 
(2005).   
 120 Brown, 326 S.E.2d at 411. 
 121 Id. at 412.    
 122 Id.  
 123 Id.   
 124 Id. at 411. 
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forbidden to inflict.”125  Notably, the court’s argument was not 
that courts allowing defendants a choice is unconstitutional, 
but rather that conditioning parole on an impermissible 
alternative to incarceration is unconstitutional.126 
State v. Brown does not involve a similar set of facts to 
Keith Fremin’s case.  Fremin is a repeat sex offender and 
molested children.127  However, the case suggests that, even if a 
defendant decides of his own volition to undergo the procedure, 
surgical castration might still implicate the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, making 
waiver of this constitutional protection complicated for 
courts.128 
III. APPLICATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: VOLUNTARY 
SURGICAL CASTRATION CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
The most likely constitutional challenge surgical 
castration faces is under the Eighth Amendment.  Surgical 
castration evokes aversion from people because it compromises 
a defendant’s bodily integrity by permanently altering the 
body.129  This conflicts with the idea that “[t]here should be an 
overwhelming presumption against having the long arm of 
government touch the human body . . . in intimate ways.”130  It 
  
 125 Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363, 
1371 (1988). 
 126 Hicks, supra note 25, at 653 (“This decision should not be misinterpreted 
as holding that allowing a defendant to choose between castration and a substantial 
prison sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  What the court found to be 
cruel and unusual was the castration of criminals, not the allowance of a choice.”). 
 127 See discussion supra Introduction. 
 128 But see Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing 
the case in which a convicted child molester was allowed to plead to a lesser charge 
with a suspended sentence if he voluntarily submitted to surgical castration, which he 
did). 
 129 Druhm, supra note 33, at 315 (“Surgical castration is very severe and 
unlikely to pass any Eighth Amendment analysis because it is permanent and 
disfiguring.”); Miller, supra note 30, at 178-79 (“There have continued to be attempts to 
use surgical castration to reduce inappropriate sexual behavior; however, because the 
procedure is irreversible, because the clinical evidence demonstrates that it is not 
always effective, and because reversible medications are now widely available, it has 
largely fallen into disfavor.”); Stadler, supra note 17, at 1322 (“There is little question 
that actual castration would be considered a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 130 Richard Lacayo, Sentences Inscribed on Flesh: The Prospect of Castration 
for a Sex Offender Raises Questions About When the Law Can Invade the Body, TIME, 
Mar. 23, 1992, at 54 (quoting Laurence Tribe, a Harvard Law School professor). 
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also conflicts with society’s values of physical autonomy and 
personal privacy.131 
Opponents of the procedure argue that surgically 
castrating sex offenders is nothing more than bodily mutilation 
and a return to a time when hangings and beheadings were 
acceptable punishments.132  These arguments suggest that 
surgical castration will have a difficult time passing 
constitutional scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.133 
A. Voluntary Surgical Castration is Punishment 
Some scholars have suggested that castration might 
pass constitutional scrutiny if it is prescribed as treatment 
rather than as punishment.134  To determine whether 
something is punishment rather than treatment, many courts 
have used a four-part test established in Rennie v. Klein as a 
useful guide.135  Under that test, a court must consider whether 
surgical castration has any therapeutic value, is recognized 
and accepted medical practice, “is . . . part of an ongoing 
psychotherapeutic program,” and has unreasonably harsh 
adverse effects.136  If surgical castration meets all four prongs, 
then it is considered treatment rather than punishment.137 
While surgical castration may have therapeutic value 
and may be imposed as part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic 
program, a court would consider the procedure punishment 
rather than treatment because it fails the second prong of the 
test.  The procedure is not recognized as an acceptable medical 
treatment for sex offenders in this country.138  Further, a court 
may find that the adverse effects of surgical castration are 
unreasonably harsh.  Side effects of surgical castration are 
permanent and include “excessive perspiration and blushing, 
  
 131 Spalding, supra note 85, at 127 (discussing the importance of requiring a 
sex offender’s consent to chemical castration). 
 132 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 387 (“Used therapeutically, surgical 
castration may very well survive a constitutional ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ 
challenge”). 
 135 Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D. N.J. 1978). 
 136 Id. at 1143; Rebish, supra note 30, at 527-28. 
 137 Rebish, supra note 30, at 527-28. 
 138 Id. at 528 (“First, surgical castration fails the second prong of the [Rennie] 
test because it is not a medically acceptable treatment for criminals in the United 
States.”). 
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loss of hair both on the body and face, increase in body weight, 
and softening of the skin.”139 
Where a sex offender volunteers for surgical castration, 
the issue is simpler.  In this situation, the defendant knows 
that if he volunteers for the procedure pursuant to a plea 
bargain or in post-trial sentencing, his sentence will likely be 
reduced.140  When the judge accepts surgical castration and 
where the procedure is a condition for a reduced sentence, the 
procedure becomes part of that reduced sentence.  Therefore, it 
qualifies as punishment and is subject to constitutional 
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. 
B. Voluntary Surgical Castration is Cruel and Unusual 
Surgical castration would fail most prongs of the Eighth 
Amendment’s test to determine what punishment is cruel and 
unusual.  First, a court would find the procedure to be 
inherently cruel for a number of reasons.  The procedure 
involves permanent change to the body141 and eliminates the 
ability of the offender to procreate.142  The Supreme Court has 
held procreation to be a fundamental right.143  This severe 
consequence of surgical castration renders the procedure 
inherently cruel. 
Society’s support of using the procedure to punish sex 
offenders is also questionable.  Physical torture and mutilation, 
once accepted in American society, are no longer so.  Since the 
operation involves injury to the body, this would shock the 
conscience.144  Further, the criminal justice system is no longer 
primarily focused on retribution in the form of an eye-for-an 
eye.145  The public would not support surgical castration as a 
  
 139 Id. at 515. 
 140 Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal 
Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 118 (1999) (stating that a defendant enters into a 
plea bargain in exchange for a prosecutor’s “promise to forego or reduce charges against 
the defendant . . . and her promise to recommend a more lenient sentence”). 
 141 William Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape 
Offenders: Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) 
(stating that surgical castration would shock the conscience because it permanently 
mutilates the body). 
 142 Peter J. Gimino III, Mandatory Chemical Castration for Perpetrators of Sex 
Offenses Against Children: Following California’s Lead, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 67, 92 (1997). 
 143 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 144 Rebish, supra note 30, at 529. 
 145 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 11 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1975) (“Physical pain, the pain of 
the body itself, is no longer the constituent element of the penalty.  From being an art 
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sanction of sexually deviant behavior146 given the nature of 
surgical castration and its side effects.147 
Second, a court would find surgical castration to be 
excessive compared to what is necessary for the state to 
accomplish its goals.  Certainly, protecting children and 
deterring sex offender activity are legitimate state aims.  But 
surgical castration would fail this test since there are less 
intrusive and traditionally accepted punishment alternatives 
available, such as imprisonment and therapy.148  There are also 
innovative methods that are available or being tested that are 
less intrusive than surgical castration, such as chemical 
castration, requiring sex offenders to register with local 
communities, and tracking devices.149   
Another reason courts would find that surgical 
castration is excessive is that research remains inconsistent on 
whether surgical castration does more to deter perpetrators 
from re-offending than other punishment methods.150  If it were 
otherwise, courts might consider the procedure more favorably 
under this test, but that is not currently the case. 
Surgical castration would also fail the proportionality 
prong of the test.  Surgical castration is an irreversible 
procedure and has numerous and long-lasting adverse side 
  
of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy of suspended rights.”); 
Miller, supra note 30, at 178 (“As physical torture and mutilation lost favor as 
legitimate methods of punishment in U.S. law, the retributive justification for 
castration virtually disappeared”). 
 146 Rebish, supra note 30, at 529. 
 147 Side effects include “excessive perspiration and blushing, [and] loss of hair 
both on the body and face.”  Id. at 515.  Unlike with chemical castration, these side 
effects are permanent.  Id. 
 148 Green, supra note 141, at 22 (“Surgical castration would fail the . . . test for 
cruel and unusual punishment because the less intrusive alternatives of imprisonment 
or psychotherapy are available.”). 
 149 One attempt to deter sex offender activity requires sex offenders to register 
with the local communities in which they settle after completing their prison sentence.  
Granlund, supra note 23, at 205-06 (discussing Megan’s Law, which requires a state to 
release information to the public about a registered sex offender).  A recent 
development in imposing harsher penalties for sex offenders involves requiring 
offenders to wear global positioning ankle bracelets for a decade or more after they get 
out of prison.  Chandler, supra note 23.  Alabama’s legislature enacted this program 
and Florida followed by “requiring certain offenders to wear [the bracelets] for life.  
New Jersey [has] approved a two-year pilot program.”  Id.  Other states are currently 
experimenting with the idea.  Id.   
 150 Miller, supra note 30, at 178-79 (‘There have continued to be attempts to 
use surgical castration to reduce inappropriate sexual behavior; however, because the 
procedure is irreversible, because the clinical evidence demonstrates that it is not 
always effective . . . it has largely fallen into disfavor.”) 
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effects.151  “[P]hysical side effects include excessive perspiration 
and blushing, loss of hair . . . body weight [gain], and softening 
of the skin.”152  Psychological side effects are unclear, but some 
research points to increased suicidal tendencies.153  However, 
the possibility of a court finding that surgical castration is 
disproportionate is less certain than the other prongs of the 
test.  If one considers that offenders often commit multiple 
crimes over a long period of time and that sex crimes leave 
deep permanent emotional marks on the victim, a court might 
find that the procedure is proportionate to the offense.154 
Finally, the last element of an Eighth Amendment 
analysis is irrelevant.  Since sex offenders would volunteer for 
surgical castration, there is no risk that the punishment would 
be inflicted arbitrarily.  Still, this would not be enough for a 
court to uphold surgical castration since the procedure fails the 
other elements of the test.  Therefore, a court would find that 
the procedure is unconstitutional as cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
IV. WAIVING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
While a court is likely to find that surgical castration is 
cruel and unusual punishment, a court should allow a sex 
offender who volunteers for the procedure to waive the Eighth 
Amendment protection.  So long as the waiver is done 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and “with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 
consequences,”155 the defendant’s choice is valid.  Voluntary 
waiver means that there is “no physical or mental coercion” 
that prompts the defendant to waive the right.156  Even though 
  
 151 Rebish, supra note 30, at 515. 
 152 Id. (listing the side effects of surgical castration). 
 153 Druhm, supra note 33, at 296 (“Furthermore, some research suggests that 
surgically castrated men may be more likely to commit suicide following the 
operation.”). 
 154 Kenneth B. Fromson, Beyond an Eye for an Eye: Castration as an 
Alternative Sentencing Measure, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 321 (1994) (“[W]hen 
one considers the seriousness of sexual abuse, and the suffering that victims are 
subjected to as a result of sexual abuse, castration should not be seen as a punishment 
disproportionate to the offense.”). 
 155 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 156 Beckman, supra note 24, at 894 (arguing that sex offenders should have 
the opportunity to waive constitutional protections). 
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a defendant may be motivated by the possibility of a reduced 
sentence, such a waiver may still be voluntary.157 
The Supreme Court has recognized in numerous cases 
that a defendant may waive fundamental constitutional 
rights.158   When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he waives a 
number of constitutionally protected rights.159  By not going to 
trial, the defendant waives his right to a trial by jury and his 
right to see and confront witnesses.160  If a defendant is an 
American citizen and pleads guilty to a crime, he might waive 
his right to vote.161 
Waiver of the Eighth Amendment protection pursuant 
to a plea bargain raises thornier issues than waivers of 
procedural protections.162 Unlike with other constitutional 
rights, the Eighth Amendment analysis is based largely on 
current societal standards.163  “The [E]ighth [A]mendment 
represents a societal interest above and beyond that of the 
individual.”164  The Supreme Court has noted that the Eighth 
Amendment is not only intended to protect defendants but 
“also expresses a fundamental interest of society in ensuring 
that state authority is not used to administer barbaric 
  
 157 Id. (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 751) (arguing that sex offenders should have 
the opportunity to waive constitutional protections).  See also Hicks, supra note 25, at 
651 (“The mere fact that the accused must face the consequences of his crime does not 
make consent invalid.  The pressure in making a decision alone does not vitiate a 
voluntary act or admission if state actors do not impose any coercion or duress.”). 
 158 For example, the Court has recognized the ability to waive the right to 
counsel.  Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 417-18 (1979).  See also Linda E. 
Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed 
Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. 
L. REV. 95, 128 (1987) (“Limits on an individual defendant’s ability to waive 
constitutional rights are warranted when society’s interests are balanced against those 
of the defendant”).  
 159 Hicks, supra note 25, at 652 (“A defendant who enters such a plea 
simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his 
accusers.” (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 495, 466 (1969))). 
 160 Kirchmeier, supra note 90, at 630. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 646 (“The justification for disallowing waiver of constitutional rights 
applies with more force where the issue involves a barbaric punishment instead of a 
procedural violation.”). 
 163 Id. at 643.  Arguments against a defendant waiving the Eighth 
Amendment focus on the strong societal interest in this constitutional protection.  See 
id. at 617-18. 
 164 Carter, supra note 158, at 144-45. 
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punishments.”165  Society has a stake in protecting defendants 
from cruel and unusual punishment.166 
Typically, debates involving waiver of the Eighth 
Amendment protection arise in cases involving a defendant 
who accepts the death penalty without going to trial or who, 
having been sentenced to death, waives his right to appeal and 
“volunteer” for execution.167  However, the arguments raised in 
the death penalty context are also relevant for the purposes of 
deciding when a sex offender should be allowed to waive the 
Eighth Amendment protection.  Those opposed to waiver of the 
Eighth Amendment argue that the Amendment is 
fundamentally different from other constitutional protections 
that a defendant has in the criminal justice process.168  This is 
primarily because of the purpose behind the Amendment, 
which is to limit the state’s power to inflict punishment on an 
individual.169 
Further, while some critics recognize that a defendant 
has an interest in controlling his defense and deciding his 
fate,170 they claim that, from a public policy perspective, the 
  
 165 Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 166 Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 811 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“Society’s independent stake in enforcement of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment cannot be overridden by a defendant’s 
purported waiver.”). 
 167 John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 939-40 (2005) (stating that “there have been 885 executions, 
106 of which, including the first, involved ‘volunteers,’ or inmates who waived their 
appeals and permitted the death sentence to be carried out.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An Argument for Restricting a 
Defendant’s Right to Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 
30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 75, 76 (2002); Tim Kaine, Capital Punishment and the Waiver of 
Sentence Review, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483, 487 (1983) (“So-called ‘voluntary’ 
executions raise difficult questions in . . . death penalty jurisprudence.  Allowing a 
defendant to terminate the review of his capital sentence injects a disturbingly 
arbitrary element into the infliction of the death penalty.”). 
 168 See Kirchmeier, supra note 90, at 617.  See also Steven A. Blum, Public 
Executions: Understanding the “Cruel and Unusual Punishments” Clause, 19 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 413, 451 (1992) (“One may not consent to cruel and unusual punishment.  
For example, even if given the choice of punishments between torture and death, the 
prisoner could not choose torture.”).  
 169 Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Eighth 
Amendment . . . also expresses a fundamental interest of society in ensuring that state 
authority is not used to administer barbaric punishments.”); Casey, supra note 167, at 
94 (“The rights created by the Eighth Amendment are not merely personal.  They are 
guarantees to society that the integrity of the criminal justice system will be 
maintained.”). 
 170 Bonnie, supra note 125, at 1366-67 (recognizing that the prisoner has an 
interest in controlling his own fate); Casey, supra note 167, at 76 (stating that an 
individual has “autonomy interests in controlling her own defense”). 
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interests of the states must trump the defendant’s interests.171  
Prohibiting a capital defendant from waiving the Eighth 
Amendment right and essentially choosing death assures 
society that no person in a democratic nation will receive such 
a punishment without a rigorous process.172 
The rights created by the Eighth Amendment are not 
simply individual rights.  They offer security and assurance to 
society of the integrity of the criminal justice system, that 
punishments will not be inflicted arbitrarily or with undue 
harshness.173  The Eighth Amendment provides society with the 
comfort of knowing that the criminal justice system is a fair 
one.  The Amendment’s goal of ensuring society that it will be 
free from cruel and unusual punishments suggests that waiver 
of this protection is prohibited when it would undermine this 
societal interest. 
A. Societal Interest in the Eighth Amendment is Weak 
When Sex Offenders Volunteer for Surgical Castration 
While the Eighth Amendment is an important 
guarantee against unchecked state powers, the societal interest 
in the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is 
weak when sex offenders volunteer for surgical castration 
pursuant to a plea bargain.174  This situation is significantly 
different from defendants in capital cases or inmates on death 
row who want to waive their appeals, where the societal 
interest is strongest.  For this reason, sex offenders who choose 
  
 171 Carter, supra note 158, at 144-45; Kirchmeier, supra note 90, at 649 (“In 
the Eighth Amendment context, there is generally no benefit for defendants or society 
in allowing defendants to be punished in a cruel and unusual manner.  In fact, such 
punishments would have a detrimental effect on society.”). 
 172 FOUCAULT, supra note 145, at 217 (“Our society is one not of spectacle, but 
of surveillance; . . . it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, 
repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully 
fabricated in it”). 
 173 Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I believe that the 
Eighth Amendment not only protects the right of individuals not to be victims of cruel 
and unusual punishment, but that it also expresses a fundamental interest of society in 
ensuring that state authority is not used to administer barbaric punishments”).  See 
also Casey, supra note 167, at 94 (“The rights created by the Eighth Amendment are 
not merely personal.  They are guarantees to society that the integrity of the criminal 
justice system will be maintained.”). 
 174 But see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1970) (“Our holding 
does not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea 
merely because a defendant wishes so to plead.  A criminal defendant does not have an 
absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the 
court . . . .”). 
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to undergo the procedure should be able to waive the protection 
from cruel and unusual punishment.175 
First, society’s interest in the Eighth Amendment 
protection is diminished when the sex offender volunteers for 
surgical castration.  The purpose of the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment expresses “a fundamental 
interest of society in ensuring that state authority is not used 
to administer barbaric punishments.”176  The Amendment is 
also about the dignity of man.177  “[I]nherent in the concept of 
human dignity is an assurance that a penalty is not imposed 
which offends the dignity and integrity of society.”178  These 
arguments presuppose that the state initiates and inflicts the 
barbaric punishment on the defendant without his consent.  
But when it is the defendant himself who initiates the 
procedure and volunteers for surgical castration, this argument 
loses strength. 
Second, the Eighth Amendment right in the particular 
context of sex offender cases is more like other constitutional 
rights a defendant may waive, such as the right to trial by 
jury,179 because waiver of this right can benefit the defendant.   
Waiving trial by jury can spare the defendant and his family 
the expense and stress of enduring a public trial.180  Waiving 
the Eighth Amendment and volunteering for surgical 
castration pursuant to a plea bargain is a similar strategic 
move since the defendant hopes to be treated for his deviant 
tendencies and receive a more advantageous sentence than 
may be expected if he went to trial.181  Viewed in this light, 
society’s interest in prohibiting the state from inflicting cruel 
  
 175 Fromson, supra note 154, at 335 (“Consequently, if a court finds a 
defendant’s request for castration to be reasonable, it could grant the constitutional 
waiver of the right to be protected from cruel and unusual punishment.” (footnote 
omitted)).  But see Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1018  (White, J., dissenting) (“I believe, 
however, that the consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal case does not privilege 
a State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 176 Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 177 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
 178 Carter, supra note 158, at 144. 
 179 Kaine, supra note 167, at 502 (“Pleas of guilty are the rule in criminal 
cases even though such pleas involve waiver of many constitutional rights of the 
defendant, including his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to 
trial by jury, and right to confront his accusors [sic].” (internal quotes and citation 
omitted)). 
 180 Kirchmeier, supra note 90, at 649. 
 181 See Hicks, supra note 25, at 652 (discussing the reasons for plea 
bargaining). 
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and unusual punishment on a criminal defendant is 
diminished. 
Finally, sex offenders waiving the Eighth Amendment 
are justified and less of a concern to society because the harm 
sex offenders suffer when they waive the protection is not 
comparable to the harm that results when defendants waive 
the Eighth Amendment in death penalty cases.182  Sex offenders 
are still able to function normally after being surgically 
castrated.183  And their motivations in waiving the protection 
are to stop committing sex offenses and to gain early release 
from prison or a reduced sentence.184 
V. BALANCING THE VARIOUS INTERESTS: WHEN SEX 
OFFENDERS MAY WAIVE THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND 
VOLUNTEER FOR SURGICAL CASTRATION 
Given that society’s interests in the Eighth Amendment 
protection is weak in cases where sex offenders volunteer for 
surgical castration, a sex offender may waive this right and 
consent to an otherwise unconstitutional punishment.  But it 
does not follow that a judge must accept the waiver as part of a 
guilty plea185 or that a state must impose such a punishment for 
which a defendant volunteers.186  Castration places the judicial 
system in a unique position because judges may be sanctioning 
a procedure that some consider an intrusion into one’s right to 
bodily integrity.187  This is of particular concern to jurists since 
the Supreme Court has dealt with the procedure’s 
  
 182 See discussion supra Part IV. 
 183 See discussion supra Part I.  
 184 Hicks, supra note 25, at 652 (discussing the reasons for plea bargaining).  
See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 185 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1970) (“Our holding does 
not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely 
because a defendant wishes so to plead.  A criminal defendant does not have an 
absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the 
court . . . .”). 
 186 Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (“I 
believe, however, that the consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal case does not 
privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth 
Amendment.”).  See also Bonnie, supra note 125, at 1371 (stating that “it is clear that 
[one] may not waive [a] constitutional ban and thus empower the state to impose a 
punishment that it is otherwise forbidden to inflict.  Similarly, although it is easy to 
understand why a rational prisoner might prefer castration to a lengthy penitentiary 
sentence, it is unlikely that the state would be permitted to offer such a choice.”). 
 187 Druhm, supra note 33, at 315 (“Surgical castration is very 
severe . . . because it is permanent and disfiguring.”); Spalding, supra note 85, at 127. 
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constitutionality only in dicta and not through a definitive 
ruling.188 
Courts must fashion ways to decide when it is 
reasonable for sex offenders to choose surgical castration.  A 
defendant should be able to choose surgical castration when 
doing so meets the interests of the defendant, criminal justice 
system, and society.  Courts should use a balancing test to 
determine when the various interests are aligned and waiver of 
the Eighth Amendment is permissible. 
In sex offender cases, the defendant has an interest in 
shaping his own defense and a right to make decisions related 
to his physical autonomy.189  The state has an interest in 
promoting the integrity of the criminal justice system.190  
Finally, the public has an interest in protecting itself from 
criminals while also promoting the values of a democratic 
society.191  If surgical castration preserves the dignity of the 
defendant and furthers the interests of the criminal justice 
system and society, then a sex offender should be allowed to 
waive the Eighth Amendment protection. 
A. Defendant’s Interests in Waiving the Eighth Amendment 
Right 
When a defendant enters a plea bargain, he does so 
after careful negotiations between his attorney and prosecutors 
and after considering his chances at trial.192  A defendant also 
enters a plea bargain with the expectation that his punishment 
will be more favorable to him than if he had been convicted 
after trial.193  This is what induces sex offenders to plead guilty 
and volunteer for surgical castration.194  When deciding to 
volunteer for surgical castration, a sex offender has a number 
  
 188 Spalding, supra note 85, at 131 (discussing Eighth Amendment Supreme 
Court cases that mention castration). 
 189 Casey, supra note 167, at 76 (stating that an individual has “autonomy 
interests in controlling her own defense”). 
 190 See Fromson, supra note 154, at 323. 
 191 Bonnie, supra note 125, at 1369 (“[S]ociety has an interest, independent of 
the prisoner’s own interest, in the integrity of its institutions of criminal punishment 
and in the dignity of the processes through which these punishments are carried out.”). 
 192 Hicks, supra note 25, at 652 (discussing the reasons for plea bargaining). 
 193 Id. (“In return, the accused receives the certainty of a more advantageous 
sentence than may be expected if the accused were to stand trial and be convicted.”). 
 194 Id. 
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of interests.195  These include controlling his defense and his 
bodily integrity. 
First, in some states, sex offenders face life in prison if 
they go to trial and a jury convicts them.  In these situations, 
the interest in controlling their defense and entering into an 
advantageous plea bargain is significant.196  Defendants have 
the right to choose options that are more favorable to their case 
and to control their own fate.197  They also have an interest in 
avoiding the burdens of trial.198  Second, inherent in our legal 
and judicial system is respect for autonomy and personal 
dignity.199  This suggests that the informed and voluntary 
choice of the defendant deserves respect.200 
Voluntary surgical castration furthers these interests.  
Not only would defendants be able to choose a procedure they 
believe will help control their sexually deviant behavior, but 
they also would have decision-making power in the plea 
bargaining process.  This self-determination and freedom to 
choose may enhance the dignity of their lives and further the 
purpose of the Eighth Amendment.201 
B. Interests of the Criminal Justice System 
The state has a legitimate interest in protecting its 
citizens, especially the most vulnerable members.  Surgical 
castration may achieve the goals of the criminal justice system.  
These goals are retribution for crime victims, deterrence of 
future criminal conduct by the offender and others, 
rehabilitation of the offender, and denunciation by society of 
  
 195 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 196 Casey, supra note 167, at 76 (stating that there is a “tension between 
society’s interest in the appropriate application of the death sentence and an 
individual’s autonomy interests in controlling her own defense.”). 
 197 Bonnie, supra note 125, at 1376 (“[A] prisoner has [the] right to control his 
own fate within the constraints established by the law.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 198 Casey, supra note 167, at 104-05. 
 199 Id. at 101 (“The respect for autonomy and personal dignity inherent in our 
judicial system suggests an interest of the individual in determining whether an 
argument will be made on her behalf.”). 
 200 Blume, supra note 167, at 941 (“Were it not for the fact that the client’s 
choice, if unfettered, will result in his death, it would be clear that this is the kind of 
ultimate . . . decision that a client is entitled to make for himself . . . .  Viewed from the 
client-choice vantage point, the only question is whether the client is competent to 
make that choice.”); Kaine, supra note 167, at 497 (discussing the rationale for waiver 
of a constitutional protection). 
 201 Blume, supra note 167, at 941 (examining arguments in favor of allowing 
death-row inmates to waive their appeals). 
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the conduct.202  Retribution involves revenge for the harm 
which society has suffered due to the criminal act.203  
Deterrence is aimed at discouraging and preventing future 
criminal activity.204  Rehabilitation is an attempt at reforming 
the wrongdoer so that he does not commit more crimes.205  And 
denunciation is an expression of society’s condemnation of the 
criminal act.206 
Surgical castration in sex offender cases accomplishes 
the retribution and denunciation goals of the criminal justice 
system.207  If the victims accept the offender’s choice of surgical 
castration, this creates a sense of retribution and justice.  
Surgical castration also allows the community in which the sex 
offender committed the heinous acts to denounce his and 
similar behavior and reassures the community that the sex 
offender will not re-offend. 
The procedure may also deter future sex offenses and 
help rehabilitate sex offenders.  Surgical castration reduces the 
recidivism rate for sex offenders.208  It can also prevent the 
offender from experiencing the urge to commit sex crimes.  
With these results, the offender may re-enter society, “rebuild 
family ties, pursue employment,” and become an active 
participant in society.209 
Further, in the case of Keith Raymond Fremin, the 
police Sergeant said Fremin’s castration request and the 
twenty-five year sentence handed down so late in his life 
(Fremin was fifty-two when the sentence was imposed) 
satisfied the department that he posed no future threat.210  
When sex offenders like Fremin are surgically castrated and 
must serve still lengthy prison sentences, it is unlikely that 
  
 202 Fromson, supra note 154, at 323 (discussing the goals of the criminal 
justice system). 
 203 Id. at 323 n.71 (citing WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 
§ 1.5(a)(6) 25 (2d ed. 1986)). 
 204 Id. (citing JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1987)) 
(discussing the goal of deterring crime). 
 205 Id. (discussing the goal of rehabilitation (citing DRESSLER, at 5)). 
 206 Id. (discussing the goal of denunciation (citing DRESSLER, at 8)). 
 207 Id. at 323 (“Castrating sexual offenders would serve both the retributive 
and denunciation goals of the criminal justice system because, as a punishment, it 
serves as a ‘device for the expression of feelings of resentment, indignation, and 
vindication.’” (quoting Lauren J. Abrams, Sexual Offenders and the Use of Depo-
Provera, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 565, 576 (1985))). 
 208 See discussion supra Part I. 
 209 Jason O. Runckel, Abuse It and Lose It: A Look at California’s Mandatory 
Chemical Castration Law, 28 PAC. L.J. 547, 591 (1997).  
 210 Gordon, supra note 2. 
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they will commit similar crimes once they gain their release 
from prison. 
C. Society’s Interests 
Society has dual interests in protecting the individual 
integrity of the defendant while appropriately punishing the 
offender.  The public legitimately wants to protect people from 
sex offenders who might commit crimes again and again.211  
Because an offender has broken the law, society has an interest 
in seeing him punished.212 
Surgical castration of sex offenders might meet these 
interests.  First, surgical castration furthers society’s interest 
in protecting the integrity of the defendant.  The defendant 
himself has made the decision to undergo a medical procedure.  
By respecting this decision in the context of the other interests 
involved, the defendant’s integrity may be maintained. 
Second, surgical castration can give the victims and 
community a sense of justice, denunciation, and retribution.213  
Statistics reveal that the average sex offender may commit 
almost 400 sex crimes.214  Since surgical castration reduces 
recidivism rates among sex offenders, public safety is 
protected.  Further, voluntary surgical castration shows that 
the defendant is publicly accepting responsibility for his acts, 
admitting guilt, and showing remorse.215  If courts allow sex 
offenders to volunteer for surgical castration, society stands to 
gain an enormous benefit. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In today’s world, it is clear that incarceration alone is an 
insufficient punishment and deterrent for sex offender activity.  
Children continue to be molested216 and society is constantly 
seeking ways of preventing sex offenders from committing 
  
 211 See discussion supra Part I.B.  Larry Don McQuay told a reporter on the 
television news program 20/20 that “‘we just bide our time in jail, daydreaming about 
children.’”  Berlin, supra note 37, at 169 (footnote omitted).   
 212 FOUCAULT, supra note 145, at 90. 
 213 See discussion supra Part V.B. 
 214 Runckel, supra note 209, at 589. 
 215 Casey, supra note 167, at 101 (discussing the respect for autonomy and 
personal dignity inherent in the judicial system). 
 216 Runckel, supra note 209, at 589 (stating that the average sex offender is 
likely to commit numerous crimes over his lifetime). 
720 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
more crimes.217  The debate surrounding castration as a form of 
punishment for sex offenders began when California enacted 
the first chemical castration legislation.218  The growth in state 
legislation allowing surgical castration and the willingness of 
sex offenders to volunteer for the procedure suggest growing 
acceptance of the procedure among sex offenders as well as the 
court system.219 
Considering that deterring sex offender activity has 
been difficult and that sex offenders tend to re-offend, surgical 
castration is an effective punishment of sex offender activity.  
Unlike other forms of punishment, surgical castration is 
permanent and drastically reduces the sex offender’s 
recidivism rate. 
Surgical castration likely violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s guarantee that individuals shall be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment.  But when an informed sex 
offender volunteers for surgical castration, the arguments in 
support of the Eighth Amendment protection diminish.  
Therefore, a sex offender who volunteers for surgical castration 
should be allowed to waive the Eighth Amendment protection 
from cruel and unusual punishment.  Courts may accept the 
waiver only when doing so meets the goals of the defendant, 
criminal justice system, and society. 
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